Τί εἶπε ὁ Einstein ἐκτὸς τῆς Θεωρίας τῆς Σχετικότητος
Ἀλληλογραφία Einstein - Freud
Ἡ ἐπιστολὴ τοῦ Albert Einstein
Πότσδαμ, 30 Ἰουλίου 1932
Ἀγαπητὲ κ. Φρόϊντ,
Ἡ πρόταση, ἡ ὁποία μοῦ ἔγινε ἀπὸ τὴν Κοινωνία τῶν Ἐθνῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τὸ «Διεθνὲς Ἰνστιτοῦτο Πνευματικῆς Συνεργασίας» τῶν Παρισίων, νὰ ἐπιλέξω κάποιον γιὰ μιὰ ἀνταλλαγὴ ἀπόψεων σὲ ἕνα θέμα τῆς ἐκλογῆς μου, μοῦ προσφέρει τὴν εὐκαιρία νὰ συζητήσω μαζί σας ἕνα ἐρώτημα, τὸ ὁποῖο, ὑπὸ τὶς σημερινὲς παγκόσμιες συνθῆκες, ἐμφανίζεται ἀπὸ τὰ πιὸ ἐπείγοντα ποὺ ἀντιμετωπίζει ὁ πολιτισμός.
Τὸ ἐρώτημα εἶναι: ὑπάρχει τρόπος νὰ ἀπαλλαγοῦν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀπὸ τὴν μοῖρα τοῦ πολέμου; Εἶναι πιὰ γνωστὸ ὅτι μὲ τὴν πρόοδο τῆς σύγχρονης ἐπιστήμης, ἡ ἀπάντηση σὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρώτημα ἔχει γίνει ζήτημα ζωῆς ἢ θανάτου γιὰ τὸν πολιτισμό. Ἐν τούτοις, παρὰ τὴν καλή μου θέληση, ὅλες οἱ προσπάθειες δὲν ἔχουν καταλήξει σὲ τίποτα τὸ συγκεκριμένο.
Ἔχοντας ἀπαλλαγὴ ἀπὸ ἐθνικιστικὲς προκαταλήψεις, ἔχω ἕναν ἁπλὸ τρόπο ἀντιμετωπίσεως τῆς ἐξωτερικῆς ὄψεως, δηλαδὴ τῆς ὀργανωτικῆς, τοῦ προβλήματος: τὰ κράτη νὰ δημιουργήσουν ἕνα νομοθετικὸ καὶ δικαστικὸ ὄργανο, τὸ ὁποῖο νὰ ἀναλάβει τὴν ἐξομάλυνση ὅλων τῶν διαφορῶν ποὺ ἀναφύονται μεταξύ τους. Σήμερα, ὅμως στερούμεθα αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὑπερεθνικοῦ ὀργάνου, τὸ ὁποῖο, θὰ ἦταν σὲ θέση νὰ ἐκδίδει ἀδιαφιλονίκητες ἀποφάσεις καὶ νὰ ἐπιβάλλει δυναμικὰ τὴν ἐκτέλεση τῶν ἀποφάσεών του.
Φθάνω ἔτσι στὸ πρῶτο μου ἀξίωμα: Προκειμένου νὰ ἐξασφαλισθεῖ ἡ διεθνὴς εἰρήνη, ἐπιβάλλεται ὅπως κάθε κράτος παραιτηθεῖ, μέσα σὲ λογικὰ ὅρια, ἀπὸ μερικὰ τῶν κυριαρχικῶν του δικαιωμάτων. Αὐτὸς εἶναι ἀναμφισβήτητα ὁ μόνος δρόμος γιὰ νὰ φθάσουμε σὲ παρόμοια εἰρήνη.
Τὸ πρῶτο Ἀξίωμα: Ἡ ἀποτυχία, παρὰ τὶς προσπάθειες ποὺ κατεβλήθησαν τὴν τελευταία δεκαετία πρὸς αὐτὴ τὴν κατεύθυνση, μᾶς πείθει ὅτι ἐπεμβαίνουν ἰσχυροὶ ψυχολογικοὶ παράγοντες, οἱ ὁποῖοι παραλύουν κάθε προσπάθεια. Μερικοὶ ἀπὸ τοὺς ἐν λόγῳ παράγοντες εἶναι προφανεῖς. Ἡ δίψα τῆς ἐξουσίας τῆς κρατούσης τάξεως εἶναι, σὲ ὅλα τὰ κράτη, ἀντίθετη πρὸς κάθε περιορισμὸ τῆς ἐθνικῆς κυριαρχίας. Αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπέρμετρη ἐπιθυμία πολιτικῆς ἐξουσίας συμβαδίζει μὲ τοὺς στόχους ἐκείνων, οἱ ὁποῖοι ἀποβλέπουν μόνο σὲ οἰκονομικὰ πλεονεκτήματα. Ἀναφέρομαι, κυρίως, σὲ αὐτή την περιορισμένη, ἀλλὰ ἀποφασιστικὴ ὁμάδα, ἡ ὁποία, δραστήρια σὲ κάθε κράτος καὶ ἀδιάφορη πρὸς κάθε «κοινωνικὸ περιορισμό», βλέπει στὸν πόλεμο, δηλαδὴ στὴν κατασκευὴ καὶ πώληση πυρομαχικῶν, ἁπλῶς καὶ μόνο μιὰ εὐκαιρία προωθήσεως τῶν ἀτομικῶν της συμφερόντων. Πῶς εἶναι δυνατὸν αὐτὴ ἡ μειονότητα νὰ κατορθώνει νὰ ὑποδουλώνει στὴν ἀπληστία της τὴν μᾶζα τοῦ λαοῦ, ἡ ὁποία τὸ μόνο ποὺ περιμένει ἀπὸ ἕνα πόλεμο εἶναι νὰ ὑποφέρει καὶ νὰ χάση;
Μιὰ λογικὴ ἀπάντηση θὰ ἦταν ὅτι ἡ μειονότητα, ἡ ὁποία ἐκ περιτροπῆς κατέχει τὴν ἐξουσία, ἐξουσιάζει πρὶν ἀπ’ ὅλα τὸ σχολεῖο καὶ τὸν Τύπο καί, ἐπὶ πλέον, τὶς θρησκευτικὲς ὀργανώσεις. Αὐτό της ἐπιτρέπει νὰ κατευθύνει καὶ νὰ παραπλανᾶ τὰ αἰσθήματα τῆς μάζας, καθιστῶντας την ὄργανο τῆς πολιτικῆς της.
Ὡστόσο, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀπάντηση δὲν δίνει μιὰ ὁλοκληρωμένη ἐξήγηση καὶ προκαλεῖ ἕνα ἑπόμενο ἐρώτημα: Πῶς εἶναι δυνατὸν ἡ μᾶζα νὰ ἀφήνεται νὰ ἐξάπτεται μὲ τὰ μέσα ποὺ ἀναφέραμε, φθάνοντας στὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ὁλοκαύτωμά της;
Ἡ εὐχαρίστηση τοῦ μίσους. Στὸ ἐρώτημα αὐτὸ ὑπάρχει μιὰ δυνατὴ ἀπάντηση: Γιατί στὸν ἄνθρωπο εἶναι ἔμφυτη ἡ εὐχαρίστηση τοῦ μίσους καὶ τῆς καταστροφῆς
.Ὑπὸ ὁμαλὲς συνθῆκες, τὸ πάθος αὐτὸ παραμένει ἐν ὑπνώσει καὶ ἀφυπνίζεται μόνο σὲ ἐξαιρετικὲς περιστάσεις. Εἶναι εὔκολο ὅμως τὸ πάθος αὐτὸ νὰ μεταβληθεῖ σὲ ὁμαδικὴ ψύχωση. Φθάνουμε ἔτσι στὸ τελευταῖο ἐρώτημα: Εἶναι δυνατὸν νὰ καθοδηγηθεῖ ἡ ψυχολογικὴ ἀνάπτυξη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔτσι ὥστε νὰ καταστεῖ ἱκανὸς νὰ ἀντισταθεῖ στὴν ψύχωση τοῦ μίσους καὶ τῆς καταστροφῆς;
Δὲν ἀναφέρομαι ἐδῶ μόνο στὶς λεγόμενες ἀμόρφωτες μᾶζες. Ἡ πεῖρα ἀποδεικνύει ὅτι ἐκείνη ποὺ ὑποκύπτει πρώτη σὲ αὐτὲς τὶς ὁμαδικὲς καταστρεπτικὲς ὑποβολές, εἶναι ἡ λεγόμενη «διανόηση». Γιατί ὁ διανοούμενος δὲν ἔχει ἄμεση ἐπαφὴ μὲ τὴν σκληρὴ πραγματικότητα, τὴν ὁποία ζεῖ μέσα ἀπὸ τὴν πιὸ εὔκολη συνοπτικὴ μορφή της: τὴν τυπωμένη σελίδα.
Καταλήγω: Ἀναφέρθηκα ἕως τώρα σὲ πολέμους μεταξὺ κρατῶν, δηλαδὴ σὲ διεθνεῖς πολέμους. Ἔχω ὅμως πλήρη ἐπίγνωση τοῦ γεγονότος ὅτι τὸ ἐπιθετικὸ ἔνστικτο ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλες συνθῆκες: ἀναφέρομαι στοὺς ἐμφυλίους πολέμους π.χ., τοὺς ὀφειλόμενους κάποτε σὲ θρησκευτικὸ φανατισμὸ καὶ κάποτε, ὅπως σήμερα σὲ κοινωνικοὺς παράγοντες, ἢ ἀκόμη στὶς φυλετικὲς καταστάσεις μειονοτήτων.
Ξέρω ὅτι στὰ βιβλία σας μποροῦμε νὰ βροῦμε σαφεῖς ἢ ἔμμεσες ἀπαντήσεις σὲ ὅλα τὰ ἐρωτηματικὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ προβλήματος, ποὺ εἶναι καὶ ἐπεῖγον καὶ ἀπαράγραπτο. Θὰ ἦταν ὡστόσο πάρα πολὺ χρήσιμο σὲ ὅλους μας, ἂν μᾶς ἐκθέσετε τὸ πρόβλημα τῆς παγκοσμίου εἰρήνης ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς τῶν τελευταίων ἀνακαλύψεών σας, γιατί αὐτὸ θὰ μᾶς δείξει τὸν δρόμο γιὰ νέους καὶ ἀποτελεσματικοὺς τρόπους δράσης.
Ἐγκάρδια δικός σας
Ἄλμπερτ Ἀϊνστάιν
Ἡ ἀπάντηση τοῦ Sigmund Freud
Βιέννη Σεπτέμβριος 1932
Ἀγαπητὲ κ. Ἀϊνστάϊν
Ἀρχίζετε μὲ τὴ σχέση μεταξὺ νόμου καὶ δυνάμεως. Μπορῶ νὰ ἀντικαταστήσω τὴ λέξη «δύναμη» μὲ τὴν πιὸ σκληρὴ καὶ ὠμὴ λέξη «βία»; Δίκαιο καὶ βία ἀποτελοῦν γιὰ μᾶς ὅρους ἐκ διαμέτρου ἀντιθέτους.
Εἶναι εὔκολο νὰ ἀποδείξουμε ὅτι τὸ ἕνα ἀνεπτύχθη ἀπὸ τὸ ἄλλο. Καί, ἂν ἀνατρέξουμε στὴν ἀρχαιότητα γιὰ νὰ ἐπαληθεύσουμε ὅτι αὐτὸ ἴσχυε ἀνέκαθεν, ἡ λύση τοῦ προβλήματος δὲν θὰ εἶναι δύσκολη.
Οἱ συγκρούσεις συμφερόντων μεταξὺ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λύονται κατ’ ἀρχὴν μὲ τὴ χρήση βίας. Αὐτὸ συμβαίνει σὲ ὅλο τὸ ζωικὸ βασίλειο, στὸ ὁποῖο ἀνήκει καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Στὸν ἄνθρωπο, ὅμως, θὰ πρέπει, γιὰ τὴν ἀλήθεια, νὰ προσθέσουμε καὶ τὶς ἰδεολογικὲς συγκρούσεις οἱ ὁποῖες , προκειμένου νὰ εἶναι ἀποφασιστικὲς ἀπαιτοῦν μιὰ ἄλλη τακτική. Αὐτὸ ὅμως συνέβη ἀργότερα, ὅπως θὰ δοῦμε συνέχεια.
Ἀρχικά, σὲ μιὰ μικρὴ ἀνθρώπινη ὁμάδα, ἡ μεγαλύτερη μυϊκὴ δύναμη ἀποφάσιζε σὲ ποιόν θὰ ἀνῆκε κάτι, ἢ τίνος ἡ θέληση θὰ ἐπικρατοῦσε. Σύντομα ὅμως ἡ μυϊκὴ δύναμη ἀντικαταστάθηκε ἀπὸ τὴν χρήση ὀργάνων: νικοῦσε ὅποιος εἶχε τὸ καλύτερο ὅπλο, ἢ τὸ χρησιμοποιοῦσε μὲ περισσότερη ἐπιτηδειότητα.
Μὲ τὴν ἐμφάνιση τῶν ὅπλων, ἡ πνευματικὴ ὑπεροχὴ ἀρχίζει καὶ παίρνει τὴ θέση τῆς κτηνώδους μυϊκῆς δυνάμεως, παρ’ ὅλο ὅτι ὁ τελικὸς σκοπὸς τοῦ ἀγῶνος παραμένει ὁ ἴδιος: τὸ ἕνα ἀπὸ τὰ δύο μέρη ὑποχρεώνεται νὰ παραιτηθεῖ ἀπὸ τὶς διεκδικήσεις του, ἢ τὶς ἀντιρρήσεις του.
Αὐτὸ ἐπιτυγχάνεται κατὰ τρόπο ριζικότερο, ὅταν ἡ βία ἐξουδετερώνει ὁριστικὰ τὸν ἀντίπαλο, δηλαδὴ τὸν σκοτώνει. Τὸ σύστημα αὐτὸ ἔχει δύο πλεονεκτήματα: ὅτι ὁ ἀντίπαλος δὲν μπορεῖ νὰ ξαναρχίσει τὶς ἐχθροπραξίες καὶ ὅτι ἡ τύχη του ἀποθαρρύνει τοὺς ἄλλους νὰ ἀκολουθήσουν τὸ παράδειγμά του.
Καμιὰ φορά, ὅμως, τὴν ἀπόφαση τοῦ φόνου ἀνατρέπει ἡ σκέψη ὅτι ὁ ἐχθρὸς μπορεῖ νὰ χρησιμοποιηθεῖ σὲ ὑπηρετικὰ καθήκοντα, ἐὰν τρομοκρατηθεῖ καὶ τοῦ χαριστεῖ ἡ ζωή. Στὴν περίπτωση αὐτὴ ἡ βία περιορίζεται νὰ τὸν κάνει ὑποχείριο της ἀντὶ νὰ τὸν σκοτώσει. Ἀλλὰ ὁ νικητὴς θὰ ἔχει στὸ ἑξῆς νὰ ἀντιμετωπίζει τὴν μανία τῆς ἐκδικήσεως τοῦ ἡττημένου, ὁ ὁποῖος θὰ βρίσκεται σὲ συνεχῆ ἀναμονή.
Τὸ δικαίωμα τῆς ἀντιθέσεως στὴ βία. Αὐτή, λοιπόν, ἦταν ἀρχικὰ ἡ κατάσταση: ἡ ἐπικράτηση τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου, τῆς κτηνώδους βίας, ἢ τῆς βίας ποὺ τὴν στήριζε ἡ εὐφυΐα. Γνωρίζουμε ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ καθεστὼς μετεβλήθη στὴν διάρκεια τῆς ἐξελίξεως, ὅτι ἕνας δρόμος ὁδήγησε ἀπὸ τὴν βία στὸ δίκαιο, στὸ νόμο. Ποιός, ὅμως;
Κατὰ τὴν γνώμη μου, ἐκεῖνος ὁ δρόμος ποὺ περνοῦσε ἀπὸ τὴν διαπίστωση ὅτι ἡ μεγαλύτερη δύναμη τοῦ ἑνὸς μποροῦσε νὰ ἀντιμετωπισθεῖ ἀπὸ τὴν ἕνωση τῶν περισσοτέρων ἀδυνάτων. Ἡ ἰσχὺς ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει. Ἡ βία καταπολεμεῖται ἀπὸ τὴν συνένωση τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἡ δύναμη αὐτῶν ποὺ συνενώθηκαν ἐκπροσωπεῖ τώρα τὸ δικαίωμα τῆς ἀντιθέσεως στὴν βία τοῦ ἑνός.
Βλέπουμε, λοιπόν, ὅτι τὸ δίκαιο εἶναι ἡ δύναμη μιᾶς κοινότητος. Ἡ ὁποία παραμένει πάντα βία, ἕτοιμη νὰ ἐκδηλωθεῖ ἐναντίον ἐκείνου ποὺ τῆς ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνεργεῖ μὲ τὰ ἴδια μέσα, ἀκολουθεῖ τοὺς ἴδιους σκοπούς. Στὴν πραγματικότητα, ἡ μόνη διαφορὰ βρίσκεται στὸ γεγονὸς ὅτι δὲν θριαμβεύει πιὰ ἡ βία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ ἡ βία τῆς κοινότητος.
Ἀλλὰ γιὰ νὰ πραγματοποιηθεῖ αὐτὸ τὸ πέρασμα τῆς βίας στὸ νέο δίκαιο, πρέπει νὰ ἐκπληρωθεῖ μιὰ ψυχολογικὴ προϋπόθεση. Ἡ ἕνωση τῶν πολλῶν θὰ πρέπει νὰ εἶναι μόνιμη, σταθερή. Ἐὰν πραγματοποιηθεῖ μόνο πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸ νὰ καταπολεμηθεῖ ὁ προπέτης γιὰ νὰ διαλυθεῖ μετὰ τὴν ἧττα του, δὲν ἐπιτυγχάνεται τίποτα. Ὁ πρῶτος ποὺ θὰ θεωροῦσε τὸν ἑαυτό του ἰσχυρότερο, θὰ φιλοδοξοῦσε ἐκ νέου νὰ κυριαρχήσει διὰ τῆς βίας, καὶ τὸ παιχνίδι θὰ ἐπαναλαμβανόταν χωρὶς τέλος.
Ἡ κοινότητα ὀφείλει νὰ παραμένει συνεχῶς ἡνωμένη, νὰ προδιαγράψει τοὺς κανόνες ποὺ θὰ προλαμβάνουν τὶς ἀνταρσίες, νὰ διορίσει τὰ ὄργανα τὰ ὁποῖα θὰ ἀγρυπνοῦν γιὰ τὴν τήρηση τῶν κανόνων, τῶν νόμων, καὶ τὰ ὁποῖα ὄργανα θὰ προνοοῦν γιὰ τὴν ἐκτέλεση τῶν νομίμων πράξεων βίας. Σὲ μιὰ παρόμοια κοινότητα συμφερόντων δημιουργοῦνται μεταξὺ τῶν μελῶν μιᾶς ἑνωμένης ἀνθρώπινης ὁμάδος συναισθηματικοὶ δεσμοί, κοινὰ αἰσθήματα στὰ ὁποῖα στηρίζεται ἡ πραγματική της δύναμη.
Σὲ τί χρησιμεύουν οἱ νόμοι.
Τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἁπλό, σὲ ὅσο διάστημα ἡ κοινότητα ἀποτελεῖται ἀπὸ ὁρισμένα ἄτομα ἐξ ἴσου ἰσχυρά, οἱ νόμοι αὐτῆς τῆς «ὁμάδος» καθορίζουν μέχρι ποιοῦ σημείου θὰ πρέπει νὰ περιορισθεῖ ἡ ἐλευθερία τοῦ κάθε ἀτόμου νὰ χρησιμοποιεῖ τὴν δύναμη τοῦ κατὰ τρόπο βίαιο, ὥστε νὰ καταστήσει δυνατὴ μιὰ ἀσφαλὴς κοινὴ ζωή.
Ἕνα ὅμως παρόμοιο εἰρηνικὸ καθεστὼς εἶναι νοητὸ μόνο θεωρητικὰ Γιατί στὴν πραγματικότητα, οἱ περιστάσεις περιπλέκονται, γιὰ τὸν λόγο ὅτι ἡ κοινότητα, εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, περιλαμβάνει ἐξ ἴσου δυναμικά, ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες, γονεῖς καὶ παιδιά, καὶ σύντομα, συνεπείᾳ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῶν καθυποτάξεων, νικητὲς καὶ ἡττημένους, οἱ ὁποῖοι μεταβάλλονται σὲ κυρίους καὶ σκλάβους. Τὸ δικαίωμα τῆς κοινότητος καθίσταται τότε ἔκφραση τῆς σχέσεως ἄνισων δυνάμεων στὸ ἐσωτερικό της, οἱ νόμοι γίνονται ἀπό, καὶ γιὰ ἐκείνους, ποὺ διοικοῦν, οἱ ὁποῖοι παραχωροῦν ἐλάχιστα δικαιώματα σὲ αὐτοὺς ποὺ καθυπόταξαν.
Ἀπὸ τὴν στιγμὴ ἐκείνη ὑπάρχουν στὴν κοινότητα δύο πηγὲς ἀνησυχίας, ἀλλὰ καί τελειοποιήσεως τοῦ νόμου. Πρῶτον, ἡ προσπάθεια τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ ἄλλου ἀτόμου γιὰ νὰ ὑψωθεῖ ὑπεράνω τῶν περιορισμῶν ποὺ ἰσχύουν γιὰ ὅλους, γιὰ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴ συνεπῶς ἀπὸ τὴν βασιλεία τοῦ νόμου σὲ ἐκείνη τῆς βίας καί, δεύτερον τὴν συνεχῆ προσπάθεια τῶν ὑπηκόων γιὰ τὴν ἀπόσπαση περισσότερης ἐξουσίας καὶ νομιμοποιήσεως αὐτῶν τῶν μεταβολῶν, δηλαδὴ ἀπὸ τὴν ἰσότητα τῶν νόμων γιὰ ὅλους, στὴν ἰσότητα τῶν νόμων γιὰ μερικούς.
Αὐτὴ ἡ ἐξελικτικὴ διαδικασία καθίσταται ἰδιαίτερα σημαντικὴ ὅταν ἐκδηλώνονται μετατοπίσεις τῆς ἐξουσίας στὸ ἐσωτερικὸ τῆς κοινότητος, ὅπως μπορεῖ νὰ συμβεῖ λόγῳ ἱστορικῶν αἰτίων.
Τὸ δίκαιον, ὁ νόμος, μπορεῖ προσαρμοσθεῖ βαθμιαίως στὶς καινούργιες σχέσεις τῆς ἐξουσίας ἤ, πρᾶγμα ποὺ συμβαίνει συχνότερα, ἡ κυρίαρχη τάξη νὰ μὴ εἶναι ἕτοιμη νὰ ἀντιμετωπίσει αὐτὴ τὴν μεταβολή, ὁπότε φθάνουμε στὴν ἐξέγερση, στὸν ἐμφύλιο πόλεμο, δηλαδὴ σὲ μιὰ προσωρινὴ κατάλυση τοῦ νόμου καὶ σὲ νέες ἐκδηλώσεις βίας, μετὰ τὶς ὁποῖες ἐγκαθιδρύεται μιὰ νέα τάξη δικαίου.
Βλέπουμε, λοιπόν, ὅτι καὶ στοὺς κόλπους μιᾶς κοινότητας δὲν ἀποφεύγεται ἡ βίαια λύση τῶν οἰκονομικῶν συγκρούσεων. Ἀλλὰ οἱ ἀνάγκες καὶ ἡ ταυτότητα τῶν συμφερόντων, ποὺ προκύπτουν ἀπὸ τὴν ζωή, εὐνοοῦν μιὰ γρήγορη λύση αὐτῶν τῶν ἀγώνων, ἐνῷ ἡ πιθανότητα εἰρηνικῆς λύσεως αὐτῶν τῶν καταστάσεων αὐξάνει συνεχῶς.
Μιὰ ματιὰ στὴν ἱστορία τῆς ἀνθρωπότητας, θὰ μᾶς δείξει μιὰ ἀδιάκοπη σειρὰ συγκρούσεων μεταξὺ μιᾶς κοινότητος καὶ μιᾶς ἄλλης, ἢ μεταξὺ πολλῶν, μεταξὺ πόλεων, χωρῶν, φυλῶν, λαῶν, κρατῶν, οἱ ὁποῖες γίνονται σχεδὸν πάντα διὰ τῆς προσφυγῆς στὴν βία τοῦ πολέμου.
Οἱ πόλεμοι αὐτοὶ καταλήγουν ἢ σὲ λεηλασίες ἢ σὲ ἀπόλυτη ὑποταγὴ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπὸ τὸν ἄλλον. Οἱ κατακτητικοὶ πόλεμοι δὲν μποροῦν νὰ κριθοῦν συνολικά. Μερικοί, ὅπως τῶν Τούρκων καὶ τῶν Μογγόλων, δὲν προκάλεσαν παρὰ μόνο δυστυχία, ἐνῷ ἄλλοι ἀντίθετα, συνετέλεσαν στὴν μετατροπὴ τῆς βίας σὲ νόμο, δημιουργῶντας μεγαλύτερες μονάδες, μέσα στὶς ὁποῖες ἡ δυνατότητα προσφυγῆς στὴν βία ἐξουδετερώνετε, ἐνῷ μιὰ νέα νομοθετικὴ τάξη συμβίβαζε τὶς διαφορές. Ὅπως οἱ κατακτήσεις τῶν Ρωμαίων ἔδωσαν στὶς μεσογειακὲς χῶρες το πολύτιμο «Πὰξ Ρομάνα».
Ὁ πόλεμος ὡς μέσον «αἰώνιας εἰρήνης».
Ἡ ἀπληστία τῶν Γάλλων βασιλέων νὰ ἐπεκτείνουν τὰ κτήματά τους δημιούργησε μιὰ Γαλλία ἡνωμένη, εὐημεροῦσα. Ὅσο κι’ ἂν αὐτὸ μπορεῖ νὰ φανεῖ παράδοξο, θὰ πρέπει ὡστόσο νὰ παραδεχθοῦμε ὅτι ὁ πόλεμος δὲν θὰ ἦταν ἕνα ἀνάρμοστο μέσον γιὰ τὴν ἐγκαθίδρυση τῆς «αἰώνιας» εἰρήνης, γιατί ἐπιτρέπει τὴν δημιουργία αὐτῶν τῶν μεγάλων μονάδων μέσα στὶς ὁποῖες μιὰ ἰσχυρὴ κεντρικὴ ἐξουσία καθιστᾶ ἀδύνατο τὸν πόλεμο.
Ὡστόσο, δὲν τὸ κατορθώνει, γιατί οἱ ἐπιτυχίες τῆς κατακτήσεως κατὰ κανόνα δὲν διαρκοῦν.
Γιὰ ὅτι ἀφορᾶ τὴν ἐποχή μας ὁδηγούμενα στὸ ἴδιο συμπέρασμα, στὸ ὁποῖο καταλάβατε καὶ ἐσεῖς ἀπὸ συντομότερο δρόμο. Μία ἀσφαλὴς πρόληψη τοῦ πολέμου εἶναι δυνατὴ μόνο ἐὰν οἱ ἄνθρωποι συμφωνήσουν γιὰ τὴν σύσταση μιᾶς κεντρικῆς ἐξουσίας, στῆς ὁποίας τὴν κρίση θὰ ὑποβάλλονται ὅλες οἱ διαφορές. Στὴν πρόταση αὐτὴ περιέχονται δύο διαφορετικὲς ἀνάγκες: ἡ δημιουργία ἑνὸς Ἀνωτάτου Δικαστηρίου καὶ ἡ ἐξασφάλιση τῆς ἀπαιτούμενης ἐξουσίας. Ἡ πρώτη χωρὶς τὴν δεύτερη δὲν θὰ ὠφελοῦσε σὲ τίποτα.
Δύο ἀντίθετες παρορμήσεις.
Ἂς ἐξετάσουμε τώρα μιὰ ἄλλη ἀπὸ τὶς προτάσεις σας. Ἀπορεῖτε ὅτι εἶναι τόσο εὔκολο νὰ παρασυρθοῦν οἱ ἄνθρωποι στὸν πόλεμο καὶ ὑποθέτετε ὅτι μέσα τους ὑπάρχει πράγματι μιὰ παρόρμηση πρὸς τὸ μῖσος καὶ τὴν καταστροφή.
Συμφωνῶ μαζί σας ἀπόλυτα. Πιστεύουμε πράγματι στὴν ὕπαρξη αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνστίκτου καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα χρόνια προσπαθήσαμε νὰ μελετήσουμε τὶς ἐκδηλώσεις του. Θὰ μοῦ ἐπιτρέψετε νὰ ἐκθέσω μέρος τῆς θεωρίας τῶν ἐνστίκτων, στὴν ὁποίαν φθάσαμε ἔπειτα ἀπὸ πολλὰ λάθη καὶ δισταγμούς.
Εἰκάζουμε ὅτι οἱ παρορμήσεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι δύο εἰδῶν: αὐτὲς ποὺ τείνουν νὰ διαιωνίσουν καὶ νὰ ἑνώσουν καὶ τὶς ὁποῖες ἀποκαλοῦμε ἐρωτικὲς καὶ σεξουαλικές, καὶ ἐκεῖνες ποὺ τείνουν νὰ καταστρέψουν καὶ νὰ σκοτώσουν. Τὰ τελευταῖα αὐτὰ τὰ ἀποκαλοῦμε «ἐπιθετικὰ ἢ καταστρεπτικὰ ἔνστικτα». Καὶ οἱ δύο αὐτὲς παρορμήσεις εἶναι ἐξ ἴσου ἀπαραίτητες, γιατί τὸ φαινόμενο τῆς ζωῆς ἐξαρτᾶται ἀπὸ τὴν συμφωνία καὶ τὴν ἀντίθεσή τους.
Φαίνεται ὅμως ὅτι οὐδέποτε μιὰ παρόρμηση τοῦ ἑνὸς τύπου μπορεῖ νὰ δράση μεμονωμένως. Συνδέεται πάντοτε, ἤ, ὅπως λέμε, συμμειγνύεται, μὲ ἕνα ποσοστὸ τῆς ἄλλης, τὸ ὁποῖο ποσοστὸ τῆς μεταβάλλει τοὺς σκοπούς, ἤ, ἀναλόγως τῶν περιπτώσεων, ἐπιτρέπει ἔτσι τὴν ἐπίτευξή τους. Ἔτσι, π. χ., τὸ ἔνστικτο τῆς αὐτοσυντηρήσεως εἶναι ἀσφαλῶς ἐρωτικό, χωρὶς αὐτὸ νὰ ἐμποδίζει νὰ προσφεύγει στὴν ἐπιθετικότητα γιὰ νὰ ἐκπληρώσει τὸν σκοπό της.
Οἱ ἀνθρώπινες πράξεις ἀποκαλύπτουν καὶ μιὰ ἐπιπλοκὴ διαφορετικοῦ εἴδους. Σπανίως ἡ πράξη εἶναι ἔργο ἑνὸς μόνο παρορμητικοῦ κινήτρου, τὸ ὁποῖο, ἐξ ἄλλου, πρέπει νὰ εἶναι συνδυασμὸς ἔρωτα καὶ ἐπιθετικότητας. Κανονικά, πρέπει νὰ συντρέξουν πολλὰ παρόμοια κίνητρα γιὰ νὰ καταστήσουν δυνατὴ τὴν δράση.
Γι’ αὐτό, ὅταν οἱ ἄνθρωποι παρακινοῦνται στὸν πόλεμο, μεσολαβεῖ μέσα τους μιὰ ὁλόκληρη σειρὰ ἀπὸ συναίτια κίνητρα, εὐγενῆ καὶ χυδαῖα. Τὰ κίνητρα αὐτὰ δὲν χρειάζεται νὰ τὰ ἀπαριθμήσουμε. Σὲ αὐτὰ περιλαμβάνεται πάντα ἡ ἱκανοποίηση τῆς ἐπιθέσεως καὶ τῆς καταστροφῆς. Ἀναρίθμητες ὠμότητες τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ τῆς καθημερινῆς ζωῆς ἐπιβεβαιώνουν τὴν ὕπαρξη καὶ τὴ τὴν δύναμή τους. Ἡ ἀνάμιξη αὐτῶν τῶν καταστρεπτικῶν παρορμήσεων μὲ ἄλλες παρορμήσεις, ἐρωτικὲς καὶ ἰδεολογικές, διευκόλυνε φυσικὰ τὴν ἐκπλήρωσή τους.
Ξεκινῶντας ἀπὸ τὸ δόγμα τῶν παρορμήσεων, φθάνουμε σὲ ἕνα τύπο γιὰ νὰ προσδιορίσουμε τοὺς ἔμμεσους δρόμους τῆς καταπολεμήσεως τοῦ πολέμου. Ἐὰν ἡ ροπὴ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμο εἶναι προϊὸν τῆς καταστρεπτικῆς παρορμήσεως, τότε θὰ πρέπει νὰ ἀνατρέξουμε γιὰ νὰ τὴν καταπολεμήσουμε στὴν ἀνταγωνιστική της παρόρμηση: στὸν ἔρωτα. Ὅ,τι προκαλεῖ συναισθηματικοὺς δεσμοὺς στοὺς ἀνθρώπους, θὰ πρέπει νὰ ἐνεργῆ ἔναντι τοῦ πολέμου.
Καὶ τώρα θὰ ἤθελα νὰ συζητήσω ἕνα πρόβλημα, τὸ ὁποῖο δὲν θίγετε στὴν ἐπιστολή σας, καὶ τὸ ὁποῖον μὲ ἐνδιαφέρει ἰδιαίτερα. Γιατί ἀγανακτοῦμε τόσο ἐναντίον τοῦ πολέμου; Γιατί δὲν τὸν βλέπουμε σὰν ἕνα ἀπὸ τοὺς τόσους καὶ ἀλγεινοὺς ὀλέθρους τῆς ζωῆς;
Ὁ πόλεμος φαίνεται νὰ ταυτίζεται μὲ τὴν φύση, ἀπόλυτα δικαιολογημένα καὶ στὴν πραγματικότητα νὰ θεωρεῖται ἀναπόφευκτος. Μὴ σᾶς προξενεῖ φρίκη ἡ ἐρώτηση. Ἡ ἀπάντηση ὑπάρχει: γιατί κάθε ἄνθρωπος ἔχει δικαίωμα στὴν ζωή του, γιατί ὁ πόλεμος καταστρέφει ἀνθρώπινες ζωές, θέτει τὰ ἄτομα ὑπὸ ἀτιμωτικὲς συνθῆκες, τὰ ὑποχρεώνει, παρὰ τὴν θέλησή τους, νὰ σκοτώνουν ἄλλα ἄτομα, καταστρέφει πολύτιμες ὑλικὲς ἀξίες, προϊόντα τῆς ἀνθρώπινης ἐργασίας καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα.
Ἐπὶ πλέον ὁ πόλεμος ὑπὸ τὴν σημερινή του μορφή, δὲν δίνει καμιὰ εὐκαιρία ἐκπληρώσεως τοῦ παλαιοῦ ἡρωικοῦ ἰδεώδους, ἐνῷ ὁ αὐριανὸς πόλεμος λόγῳ τῆς τελειοποιήσεως τῶν μέσων καταστροφῆς, θὰ σημαίνει τὴν ἐξόντωση τοῦ ἑνός, ἢ καὶ τῶν δύο, ἀντιπάλων. Ὅλα εἶναι τόσο ἀληθινὰ καὶ ἀδιαφιλονίκητα, ποὺ μᾶς ἐκπλήττει τὸ γεγονὸς ὅτι ἡ προσφυγὴ στὸν πόλεμο δὲν ἔχει ἀκόμη καταργηθεῖ, βάσει μιᾶς γενικῆς συμφωνίας τῆς ἀνθρωπότητας. Ἀπὸ ἀμνημονεύτων χρόνων, ἡ ἀνθρωπότητα ὑποβάλλεται στὴν διαδικασία τοῦ ἐκπολιτισμοῦ.
Σὲ αὐτὸ ὀφείλονται ὅλα τὰ δεινά μας. Τὰ αἴτια εἶναι σκοτεινά, ἡ ἔκβαση ἀβέβαιη. Ἴσως ὁδηγεῖ στὴν ἐξαφάνιση τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου εἴδους, ἀφ’ ἑνὸς γιατί τρέφει τόσες προκαταλήψεις ἀπέναντι στὴν σεξουαλικὴ λειτουργία, καὶ ἀφ’ ἑτέρου γιατί σήμερα πολλαπλασιάζονται δυσανάλογα οἱ ἀμόρφωτες μᾶζες καὶ τὰ καθυστερημένα στρώματα τοῦ πληθυσμοῦ, ἐν σχέσει μὲ τοὺς μορφωμένους καὶ προοδευμένους.
Ἴσως αὐτὴ ἡ διαδικασία νὰ μπορεῖ νὰ συγκριθεῖ μὲ τὴν ἐξημέρωση ὁρισμένων ζώων, ἡ ὁποία ἀναμφίβολα, ἐπιφέρει φυσικὲς ἀλλοιώσεις. Δὲν ἔχουμε ἀκόμη συνηθίσει στὴν ἰδέα ὅτι ἡ ἐξέλιξη τοῦ πολιτισμοῦ εἶναι μιὰ παρόμοια ὀργανικὴ διαδικασία.
Πότε θὰ γίνουμε ὅλοι εἰρηνιστές;
Ἀπὸ τὰ ψυχολογικὰ χαρακτηριστικὰ τοῦ πολιτισμοῦ, δύο φαίνονται τὰ πιὸ σημαντικά: ἡ ἐνίσχυση τῆς νοήσεως, ἡ ὁποία ἀρχίζει νὰ κυριαρχεῖ τῶν παρορμήσεων καὶ ἡ ἐσωστρέφεια τῆς ἐπιθετικότητας, μὲ ὅλα τὰ πλεονεκτήματα καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους ποὺ ἐπακολουθοῦν. Ὅμως ὁ πόλεμος ἔρχεται σὲ πλήρη ἀντίφαση πρὸς τὸν ψυχικό μας κόσμο, ὅπως τὸν διαμόρφωσε ὁ πολιτισμός. Δὲν τὸν ἀνεχόμαστε πιά, δὲν πρόκειται μόνο γιὰ μιὰ πνευματικὴ ἄρνηση, γιὰ μᾶς τους εἰρηνιστὲς ὁ πόλεμος εἶναι ἀφόρητος ἐξ ἰδιοσυγκρασίας.
Πόσο πρέπει νὰ περιμένουμε ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι νὰ γίνουν εἰρηνιστές; Δὲν μποροῦμε, νὰ τὸ ξέρουμε, ἴσως ὅμως νὰ μὴν ἀποτελεῖ μιὰ οὐτοπικὴ ἐλπίδα, ὅτι ἡ ἐπιρροή δύο παραγόντων, ἢ ὅλο καὶ πιὸ πολιτισμένη μας στάση καὶ ὁ δικαιολογημένος φόβος τῶν συνεπειῶν ἑνὸς ὁλοκληρωτικοῦ πολέμου, θὰ τερματίσει τὸν πόλεμο στὸ προσεχὲς μέλλον. Μὲ ποιὸ τρόπο, δὲν μποροῦμε νὰ τὸ γνωρίζουμε. Στὸ μεταξύ, ὅμως, μποροῦμε νὰ ποῦμε: Ὅλα ὅσα συντελοῦν στὴν ἐκπολιτιστικὴ ἀνάπτυξη, ἐργάζονται ἐναντίον τοῦ πολέμου.
Σᾶς χαιρετῶ ἐγκάρδια. Καὶ σᾶς ζητῶ συγγνώμη ἂν οἱ παρατηρήσεις μου σᾶς ἀπογοήτευσαν.
Σίγκμουντ Φρόιντ
Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" (1932)
Potsdam, 30th July, 1932.
Dear Professor Freud,
The proposal of the League of Nations and its International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at Paris that I should invite a person, to be chosen by myself, to a frank exchange of views on any problem that I might select affords me a very welcome opportunity of conferring with you upon a question which, as things now are, seems the most insistent of all the problems civilization has to face. This is the problem: Is there any way of delivering humanity from the menace of war? It is common knowledge that, with the advance of modern science, this issue has come to mean a matter of life and death for civilization as we know it; nevertheless, for all the zeal displayed, every attempt at its solution has ended in a lamentable breakdown.
I believe, moreover, that those whose duty it is to tackle the problem professionally and practically are growing only too aware of their impotence to deal with it, and have now a very lively desire to learn the views of men who, absorbed in the pursuit of science, can see world problems in the perspective distance lends. As for me, the normal objective of my thought affords no insight into the dark places of human will and feeling. Thus, in the enquiry now proposed, I can do little more than seek to clarify the question at issue and, clearing the ground of the more obvious solutions, enable you to bring the light of your far-reaching knowledge of man’s instinctive life to bear upon the problem. There are certain psychological obstacles whose existence a layman in the mental sciences may dimly surmise, but whose interrelations and vagaries he is incompetent to fathom; you, I am convinced, will be able to suggest educative methods, lying more or less outside the scope of politics, which will eliminate these obstacles.
As one immune from nationalist bias, I personally see a simple way of dealing with the superficial (i.e. administrative) aspect of the problem: the setting up, by international consent, of a legislative and judicial body to settle every conflict arising between nations. Each nation would undertake to abide by the orders issued by this legislative body, to invoke its decision in every dispute, to accept its judgments unreservedly and to carry out every measure the tribunal deems necessary for the execution of its decrees. But here, at the outset, I come up against a difficulty; a tribunal is a human institution which, in proportion as the power at its disposal is inadequate to enforce its verdicts, is all the more prone to suffer these to be deflected by extrajudicial pressure. This is a fact with which we have to reckon; law and might inevitably go hand in hand, and juridical decisions approach more nearly the ideal justice demanded by the community (in whose name and interests these verdicts are pronounced) in so far as the community has effective power to compel respect of its juridical ideal. But at present we are far from possessing any supranational organization competent to render verdicts of incontestable authority and enforce absolute submission to the execution of its verdicts. Thus I am led to my first axiom: the quest of international security involves the unconditional surrender by every nation, in a certain measure, of its liberty of action, its sovereignty that is to say, and it is clear beyond all doubt that no other road can lead to such security.
The ill-success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this goal leaves us no room to doubt that strong psychological factors are at work, which paralyze these efforts. Some of these factors are not far to seek. The craving for power which characterizes the governing class in every nation is hostile to any limitation of the national sovereignty. This political power-hunger is wont to batten on the activities of another group, whose aspirations are on purely mercenary, economic lines. I have especially in mind that small but determined group, active in every nation, composed of individuals who, indifferent to social considerations and restraints, regard warfare, the manufacture and sale of arms, simply as an occasion to advance their personal interests and enlarge their personal authority.
But recognition of this obvious fact is merely the first step towards an appreciation of the actual state of affairs. Another question follows hard upon it: How is it possible for this small clique to bend the will of the majority, who stand to lose and suffer by a state of war, to the service of their ambitions? (In speaking of the majority, I do not exclude soldiers of every rank who have chosen war as their profession, in the belief that they are serving to defend the highest interests of their race, and that attack is often the best method of defense.) An obvious answer to this question would seem to be that the minority, the ruling class at present, has the schools and press, usually the Church as well, under its thumb. This enables it to organize and sway the emotions of the masses, and make its tool of them.
Yet even this answer does not provide a complete solution. Another question arises from it: How is it these devices succeed so well in rousing people to such wild enthusiasm, even to sacrifice their lives? Only one answer is possible. Because people have within them a lust for hatred and destruction. In normal times this passion exists in a latent state, it emerges only in unusual circumstances; but it is a comparatively easy task to call it into play and raise it to the power of a collective psychosis. Here lies, perhaps, the crux of all the complex of factors we are considering, an enigma that only the expert in the lore of human instincts can resolve.
And so we come to our last question. Is it possible to control human mental evolution so that people can resist the psychoses of hate and destructiveness? Here I am thinking by no means only of the so-called uncultured masses. Experience proves that it is rather the so-called “intelligentsia” that is most apt to yield to these disastrous collective suggestions, since the intellectual has no direct contact with life in the raw, but encounters it in its easiest, synthetic form—upon the printed page.
To conclude: I have so far been speaking only of wars between nations; what are known as international conflicts. But I am well aware that the aggressive instinct operates under other forms and in other circumstances. (I am thinking of civil wars, for instance, due in earlier days to religious zeal, but nowadays to social factors; or, again, the persecution of racial minorities.) But my insistence on what is the most typical, most cruel and extravagant form of conflict between man and man was deliberate, for here we have the best occasion of discovering ways and means to render all armed conflicts impossible.
I know that in your writings we may find answers, explicit or implied, to all the issues of this urgent and absorbing problem. But it would be of the greatest service to us all were you to present the problem of world peace in the light of your most recent discoveries, for such a presentation well might blaze the trail for new and fruitful modes of action.
Yours very sincerely, A. Einstein.
Vienna, September, 1932
Dear Professor Einstein,
When I learned of your intention to invite me to a mutual exchange of views upon a subject which not only interested you personally but seemed deserving, too, of public interest, I cordially assented. I expected you to choose a problem lying on the borderland of the knowable, as it stands today, a theme which each of us, physicist and psychologist, might approach from his own angle, to meet at last on common ground, though setting out from different premises. Thus the question which you put me—what is to be done to rid mankind of the war-menace?—took me by surprise. And, next, I was dumbfounded by the thought of my (of our, I almost wrote) incompetence; for this struck me as being a matter of practical politics, the statesman’s proper study. But then I realized that you did not raise the question in your capacity as scientist or physicist, but as a lover of his fellow men, who responded to the call of the League of Nations much as Fridtjof Nansen, the Polar explorer, took on himself the task of succouring homeless and starving victims of the World War. And, next, I reminded myself that I was not being called on to formulate practical proposals, but, rather, to explain how this question of preventing wars strikes a psychologist.
But here, too, you have stated the gist of the matter in your letter—and taken the wind out of my sails! Still, I will gladly follow in your wake and content myself with endorsing your conclusions, which, however, I propose to amplify to the best of my knowledge or surmise.
You begin with the relations between Might and Right, and this is assuredly the proper starting-point for our enquiry. But, for the term “might,” I would substitute a tougher and more telling word: “violence.” In right and violence we have today an obvious antinomy. It is easy to prove that one has evolved from the other and, when we go back to origins and examine primitive conditions, the solution of the problem follows easily enough. I must crave your indulgence if in what follows I speak of well-known, admitted facts as though they were new data; the context necessitates this method.
Conflicts of interest between people are resolved, in principle, by recourse to violence. It is the same in the animal kingdom, from which humanity cannot claim exclusion; nevertheless people are also prone to conflicts of opinion, touching, on occasion, the loftiest peaks of abstract thought, which seem to call for settlement by quite another method. This refinement is, however, a late development. To start with, brute force was the factor which, in small communities, decided points of ownership and the question of whose will was to prevail. Very soon physical force was implemented, then replaced, by the use of various adjuncts; he proved the victor whose weapon was the better, or handled the more skilfully. Now, for the first time, with the coming of weapons, superior brains began to oust brute force, but the object of the conflict remained the same: one party was to be constrained, by injury or impairment of strength, to retract a claim or a refusal. This end is most effectively gained when the opponent is definitively put out of action—in other words, is killed. This procedure has two advantages; the enemy cannot renew hostilities, and, secondly, this fate deters others from following the example. Moreover, the slaughter of a foe gratifies an instinctive craving—a point to which we shall revert hereafter. However, another consideration may be set off against this will to kill: the possibility of using enemies for servile tasks if their spirits be broken and their lives spared. Here violence finds an outlet not in slaughter but in subjugation. Hence springs the practice of showing mercy; but the victor, having from now on to reckon with the craving for revenge that rankles in the victim, forfeits some personal security.
Thus, under primitive conditions, it is superior force—brute violence, or violence backed by arms—that lords it everywhere. We know that in the course of evolution this state of things was modified, a path was traced that led away from violence to law. But what was this path? Surely it issued from a single verity; that the superiority of one strong man can be overborne by an alliance of many weaklings, that l’union fait la force. Brute force is overcome by union, the allied might of scattered units makes good its right against the isolated giant. Thus we may define “right” (i.e. law) as the might of a community. Yet it, too, is nothing else than violence, quick to attack whatever individual stands in its path, and it employs the self-same methods, follows like ends, with but one difference; it is the communal, not individual, violence that has its way. But, for the transition from crude violence to the reign of law, a certain psychological condition must first obtain. The union of the majority must be stable and enduring. If its sole raison d’être be to fight some powerful individual, after whose downfall it would be dissolved, it leads to nothing. Someone else trusting to superior power, will seek to reinstate the rule of violence and the cycle will repeat itself unendingly. Thus, the union of the people must be permanent and well organized; it must enact rules to meet the risk of possible revolts; must set up machinery ensuring that its rules—the laws—are observed and that such acts of violence as the laws demand are duly carried out. This recognition of a community of interests engenders among the members of the group a sentiment of unity and fraternal solidarity which constitutes its real strength.
So far I have set out what seems to me the kernel of the matter: the suppression of brute force by the transfer of power to a larger combination, founded on the community of sentiments linking up its members. All the rest is mere tautology and glosses. Now the position is simple enough so long as the community consists of a number of equally strong individuals. The laws of such a group can determine to what extent the individual must forfeit personal freedom, the right of using personal force as an instrument of violence, to ensure the safety of the group. But such a combination is only theoretically possible; in practice the situation is always complicated by the fact that, from the outset, the group includes elements of unequal power, men and women, elders and children, and, very soon, as a result of war and conquest, victors and the vanquished—i.e. masters and slaves—as well. From this time on the common law takes notice of these inequalities of power, laws are made by and for the rulers, giving the servile classes fewer rights. Thenceforward there exist within the state two factors making for legal instability, but legislative evolution, too: first, the attempts by members of the ruling class to set themselves above the law’s restrictions and, secondly, the constant struggle of the ruled to extend their rights and see each gain embodied in the code, replacing legal disabilities by equal laws for all. The second of these tendencies will be particularly marked when there takes place a positive mutation of the balance of power within the community, the frequent outcome of certain historical conditions. In such cases the laws may gradually be adjusted to the changed conditions or (as more usually ensues) the ruling class is loath to reckon with the new developments, the result being insurrections and civil wars, a period when law is in abeyance and force once more the arbiter, followed by a new regime of law. There is another factor of constitutional change, which operates in a wholly pacific manner, viz: the cultural evolution of the mass of the community; this factor, however, is of a different order and can only be dealt with later.
Thus we see that, even within the group itself, the exercise of violence cannot be avoided when conflicting interests are at stake. But the common needs and habits of men who live in fellowship under the same “sky” favor a speedy issue of such conflicts and, this being so, the possibilities of peaceful solutions make steady progress. Yet the most casual glance at world history will show an unending series of conflicts between one community and another or a group of others, between larger and smaller units, between cities, countries, races, tribes and kingdoms, almost all of which were settled by the ordeal of war. Such wars end either in pillage or in conquest and its fruits, the downfall of the loser. No single all-embracing judgment can be passed on these wars of aggrandizement. Some, like the war between the Mongols and the Turks, have led to unmitigated misery; others, however, have furthered the transition from violence to law, since they brought larger units into being, within whose limits a recourse to violence was banned and a new regime determined all disputes. Thus the Roman conquests brought that boon, the pax romana, to the Mediterranean lands. The French kings’ lust for aggrandizement created a new France, flourishing in peace and unity. Paradoxical as it sounds, we must admit that warfare well might serve to pave the way to that unbroken peace we so desire, for it is war that brings vast empires into being, within whose frontiers all warfare is proscribed by a strong central power. In practice, however, this end is not attained, for as a rule the fruits of victory are but short-lived, the new-created unit falls asunder once again, generally because there can be no true cohesion between the parts that violence has welded. Hitherto, moreover, such conquests have only led to aggregations which, for all their magnitude, had limits, and disputes between these units could be resolved only by recourse to arms. For humanity at large the sole result of all these military enterprises was that, instead of frequent not to say incessant little wars, they had now to face great wars which, for all they came less often, were so much the more destructive.
Regarding the world of today the same conclusion holds good, and you, too, have reached it, though by a shorter path. There is but one sure way of ending war and that is the establishment, by common consent, of a central control which shall have the last word in every conflict of interests. For this, two things are needed: first, the creation of such a supreme court of judicature; secondly, its investment with adequate executive force. Unless this second requirement be fulfilled, the first is unavailing. Obviously the League of Nations, acting as a Supreme Court, fulfils the first condition; it does not fulfil the second. It has no force at its disposal and can only get it if the members of the new body, its constituent nations, furnish it. And, as things are, this is a forlorn hope. Still we should be taking a very short-sighted view of the League of Nations were we to ignore the fact that here is an experiment the like of which has rarely—never before, perhaps, on such a scale—been attempted in the course of history. It is an attempt to acquire the authority (in other words, coercive influence), which hitherto reposed exclusively on the possession of power, by calling into play certain idealistic attitudes of mind. We have seen that there are two factors of cohesion in a community: violent compulsion and ties of sentiment (“identifications,” in technical parlance) between the members of the group. If one of these factors becomes inoperative, the other may still suffice to hold the group together. Obviously such notions as these can only be significant when they are the expression of a deeply rooted sense of unity, shared by all. It is necessary, therefore, to gauge the efficacy of such sentiments. History tells us that, on occasion, they have been effective. For example, the Panhellenic conception, the Greeks’ awareness of superiority over their barbarian neighbors, which found expression in the Amphictyonies, the Oracles and Games, was strong enough to humanize the methods of warfare as between Greeks, though inevitably it failed to prevent conflicts between different elements of the Hellenic race or even to deter a city or group of cities from joining forces with their racial foe, the Persians, for the defeat of a rival. The solidarity of Christendom in the Renaissance age was no more effective, despite its vast authority, in hindering Christian nations, large and small alike, from calling in the Sultan to their aid. And, in our times, we look in vain for some such unifying notion whose authority would be unquestioned. It is all too clear that the nationalistic ideas, paramount today in every country, operate in quite a contrary direction. There are some who hold that the Bolshevik conceptions may make an end of war, but, as things are, that goal lies very far away and, perhaps, could only be attained after a spell of brutal internecine warfare. Thus it would seem that any effort to replace brute force by the might of an ideal is, under present conditions, doomed to fail. Our logic is at fault if we ignore the fact that right is founded on brute force and even today needs violence to maintain it.
I now can comment on another of your statements. You are amazed that it is so easy to infect men with the war-fever, and you surmise that man has in him an active instinct for hatred and destruction, amenable to such stimulations. I entirely agree with you. I believe in the existence of this instinct and have been recently at pains to study its manifestations. In this connection may I set out a fragment of that knowledge of the instincts, which we psychoanalysts, after so many tentative essays and gropings in the dark, have compassed? We assume that human instincts are of two kinds: those that conserve and unify, which we call “erotic” (in the meaning Plato gives to Eros in his Symposium), or else “sexual” (explicitly extending the popular connotation of “sex”); and, secondly, the instincts to destroy and kill, which we assimilate as the aggressive or destructive instincts. These are, as you perceive, the well-known opposites, Love and Hate, transformed into theoretical entities; they are, perhaps, another aspect of those eternal polarities, attraction and repulsion, which fall within your province. But we must be wary of passing overhastily to the notions of good and evil. Each of these instincts is every bit as indispensable as its opposite and all the phenomena of life derive from their activity, whether they work in concert or in opposition. It seems that an instinct of either category can operate but rarely in isolation; it is always blended (“alloyed,” as we say) with a certain dosage of its opposite, which modifies its aim or even, in certain circumstances, is a prime condition of its attainment. Thus the instinct of self-preservation is certainly of an erotic nature, but to gain its ends this very instinct necessitates aggressive action. In the same way the love-instinct, when directed to a specific object, calls for an admixture of the acquisitive instinct if it is to enter into effective possession of that object. It is the difficulty of isolating the two kinds of instinct in their manifestations that has so long prevented us from recognizing them.
If you will travel with me a little further on this road, you will find that human affairs are complicated in yet another way. Only exceptionally does an action follow on the stimulus of a single instinct, which is per se a blend of Eros and destructiveness. As a rule several motives of similar composition concur to bring about the act. This fact was duly noted by a colleague of yours, Professor G. C. Lichtenberg, sometime Professor of Physics at Göttingen; he was perhaps even more eminent as a psychologist than as a physical scientist. He evolved the notion of a “Compasscard of Motives” and wrote: “The efficient motives impelling man to act can be classified like the 32 Winds, and described in the same manner; e.g. Food-Food-Fame or Fame-Fame-Food.” Thus, when a nation is summoned to engage in war, a whole gamut of human motives may respond to this appeal; high and low motives, some openly avowed, others slurred over. The lust for aggression and destruction is certainly included; the innumerable cruelties of history and daily life confirm its prevalence and strength. The stimulation of these destructive impulses by appeals to idealism and the erotic instinct naturally facilitates their release. Musing on the atrocities recorded on history’s page, we feel that the ideal motive has often served as a camouflage for the lust of destruction; sometimes, as with the cruelties of the Inquisition, it seems that, while the ideal motives occupied the foreground of consciousness, they drew their strength from the destructive instincts submerged in the unconscious. Both interpretations are feasible.
You are interested, I know, in the prevention of war, not in our theories, and I keep this fact in mind. Yet I would like to dwell a little longer on this destructive instinct which is seldom given the attention that its importance warrants. With the least of speculative efforts we are led to conclude that this instinct functions in every living being, striving to work its ruin and reduce life to its primal state of inert matter. Indeed it might well be called the “death-instinct”; whereas the erotic instincts vouch for the struggle to live on. The death instinct becomes an impulse to destruction when, with the aid of certain organs, it directs its action outwards, against external objects. The living being, that is to say, defends its own existence by destroying foreign bodies. But, in one of its activities, the death instinct is operative within the living being and we have sought to trace back a number of normal and pathological phenomena to this introversion of the destructive instinct. We have even committed the heresy of explaining the origin of human conscience by some such “turning inward” of the aggressive impulse. Obviously when this internal tendency operates on too large a scale, it is no trivial matter, rather a positively morbid state of things; whereas the diversion of the destructive impulse towards the external world must have beneficial effects. Here is then the biological justification for all those vile, pernicious propensities which we now are combating. We can but own that they are really more akin to nature than this our stand against them, which, in fact, remains to be accounted for.
All this may give you the impression that our theories amount to a species of mythology and a gloomy one at that! But does not every natural science lead ultimately to this—a sort of mythology? Is it otherwise today with your physical science
The upshot of these observations, as bearing on the subject in hand, is that there is no likelihood of our being able to suppress humanity’s aggressive tendencies. In some happy corners of the earth, they say, where nature brings forth abundantly whatever people desire, there flourish races whose lives go gently by, unknowing of aggression or constraint. This I can hardly credit; I would like further details about these happy folk. The Bolsheviks, too, aspire to do away with human aggressiveness by ensuring the satisfaction of material needs and enforcing equality between people. To me this hope seems vain. Meanwhile they busily perfect their armaments, and their hatred of outsiders is not the least of the factors of cohesion amongst themselves. In any case, as you too have observed, complete suppression of aggressive tendencies is not at issue; what we may try is to divert it into a channel other than that of warfare.
From our “mythology” of the instincts we may easily deduce a formula for an indirect method of eliminating war. If the propensity for war be due to the destructive instinct, we have always its counter-agent, Eros, to our hand. All that produces ties of sentiment between man and man must serve us as war’s antidote. These ties are of two kinds. First, such relations as those towards a beloved object, void though they be of sexual intent. The psychoanalyst need feel no compunction in mentioning “love” in this connection; religion uses the same language: Love thy neighbor as thyself. A pious injunction easy to proclaim, but hard to carry out! The other bond of sentiment is by way of identification. All that brings out the significant resemblances between people calls into play this feeling of community, identification, whereon is founded, in large measure, the whole edifice of human society.
In your strictures on the abuse of authority I find another suggestion for an indirect attack on the war-impulse. That people are divided into leaders and the led is but another manifestation of their inborn and irremediable inequality. The second class constitutes the vast majority; they need a high command to make decisions for them, to which decisions they usually bow without demur. In this context we would point out that people should be at greater pains than heretofore to form a superior class of independent thinkers, unamenable to intimidation and fervent in the quest of truth, whose function it would be to guide the masses dependent on their lead. There is no need to point out how little the rule of politicians and the Church’s ban on liberty of thought encourage such a new creation. The ideal conditions would obviously be found in a community where everyone subordinated instinctive life to the dictates of reason. Nothing less than this could bring about so thorough and so durable a union between people, even if this involved the severance of mutual ties of sentiment. But surely such a hope is utterly utopian, as things are. The other indirect methods of preventing war are certainly more feasible, but entail no quick results. They conjure up an ugly picture of mills that grind so slowly that, before the flour is ready, people are dead of hunger.
As you see, little good comes of consulting a theoretician, aloof from worldly contacts, on practical and urgent problems! Better it were to tackle each successive crisis with means that we have ready to our hands. However, I would like to deal with a question which, though it is not mooted in your letter, interests me greatly. Why do we, you and I and many an other, protest so vehemently against war, instead of just accepting it as another of life’s odious importunities? For it seems a natural thing enough, biologically sound and practically unavoidable. I trust you will not be shocked by my raising such a question. For the better conduct of an inquiry it may be well to don a mask of feigned aloofness. The answer to my query may run as follows: because every people has a right over their own lives and war destroys lives that were full of promise; it forces the individual into situations that shame humanity, obliging them to murder fellow human beings against their will; it ravages material amenities, the fruits of human toil, and much besides. Moreover wars, as now conducted, afford no scope for acts of heroism according to the old ideals and, given the high perfection of modern arms, war today would mean the sheer extermination of one of the combatants, if not of both. This is so true, so obvious, that we can but wonder why the conduct of war is not banned by general consent. Doubtless either of the points I have just made is open to debate. It may be asked if the community, in its turn, cannot claim a right over the individual lives of its members. Moreover, all forms of war cannot be indiscriminately condemned; so long as there are nations and empires, each prepared callously to exterminate its rival, all alike must be equipped for war. But we will not dwell on any of these problems; they lie outside the debate to which you have invited me. I pass on to another point, the basis, as it strikes me, of our common hatred of war. It is this: we cannot do otherwise than hate it. Pacifists we are, since our organic nature wills us thus to be. Hence it comes easy to us to find arguments that justify our standpoint.
This point, however, calls for elucidation. Here is the way in which I see it. The cultural development of mankind (some, I know, prefer to call it civilization) has been in progress since immemorial antiquity. To this processus we owe all that is best in our composition, but also much that makes for human suffering. Its origins and causes are obscure, its issue is uncertain, but some of its characteristics are easy to perceive. It well may lead to the extinction of humanity for it impairs the sexual function in more than one respect, and even today the uncivilized races and the backward classes of all nations are multiplying more rapidly than “the cultured elements.” This process may, perhaps, be likened to the effects of domestication on certain animals—it clearly involves physical changes of structure—but the view that cultural development is an “organic” process of this order has not yet become generally familiar. The psychic changes which accompany this process of cultural change are striking, and not to be gainsaid. They consist in the progressive rejection of instinctive ends and a scaling down of instinctive reactions. Sensations which delighted our forefathers have become neutral or unbearable to us; and, if our ethical and aesthetic ideals have undergone a change, the causes of this are “ultimately organic.” On the psychological side two of the most important phenomena of culture are, firstly, a strengthening of the intellect, which tends to master our instinctive life, and, secondly, an introversion of the aggressive impulse, with all its consequent benefits and perils. Now war runs most emphatically counter to the psychic disposition imposed on us by the growth of culture; we are therefore bound to resent war, to find it utterly intolerable. With pacifists like us it is not merely an intellectual and affective repulsion, but a constitutional intolerance, an idiosyncrasy in its most drastic form. And it would seem that the aesthetic ignominies of warfare play almost as large a part in this repugnance as war’s atrocities. How long have we to wait before the remainder of humanity turns pacifist? Impossible to say, and yet perhaps our hope that these two factors—people’s cultural disposition and a well-founded dread of the form that future wars will take—may serve to put an end to war in the near future, is not chimerical. But by what ways or by-ways this will come about, we cannot guess. Meanwhile we may rest on the assurance that whatever makes for cultural development is working also against war.
With kindest regards and, should this exposé prove a disappointment to you, my sincere regrets,
Yours, Sigmund Freud